The study of other-regarding player behavior such as altruism and spite in games has recently received quite some attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in which there is a complex underlying social structure, causing the players to direct their altruistic and spiteful behavior in a refined player-specific sense (depending, for example, on friendships that exist among the players). Our findings show that the increase in the price of anarchy is modest for congestion games and minsum scheduling games, whereas it might be drastic for generalized second price auctions.
Introduction
Many practical situations involve a group of strategic decision makers who attempt to achieve their own self-interested goals. It is well known that strategic decision making may result in outcomes that are suboptimal for the society as a whole. The need to gain an accurate understanding of the extent of suboptimality caused by selfish behavior has led to the study of the inefficiency of equilibria in algorithmic game theory. In this context, a common inefficiency measure is the price of anarchy [27] , which relates the worst-case cost of a Nash equilibrium to the one of an optimal outcome.
More recently, quite some attention has been given to more general settings in which the players do not necessarily behave entirely selfishly, but may alternatively exhibit spiteful or altruistic behavior; see, for instance, [4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 20, [23] [24] [25] . Studying such alternative behaviors in games is motivated by the observation that altruism and spite are phenomena that frequently occur in real life (see, e.g., [21] ). Consequently, it is desirable to incorporate such alternative behavior in gametheoretical analyses.
Previous work on the price of anarchy for spiteful and altruistic games has focused on simple models of spite and altruism, where a spite/altruism level α i is associated to each player i denoting the extent to which his perceived cost is influenced by any nonspecific other player. Already for these simple models it has been observed in a series of papers [7, 10, 12] that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as players become more altruistic. For example, Chen et al. [12] show that for congestion games with linear latency functions and uniform players (i.e., α i = α ∈ [0, 1] for every i) the price of anarchy is 5+4α 2+α and this bound is tight. In particular, the price of anarchy degrades from 2.5 in the purely selfish setting (α = 0) to 3 in the fully altruistic setting (α = 1).
This observation served as a starting point for the investigations conducted in this paper. The main question that we address here is: How severe can this effect be if one considers more refined models of altruism that capture complex social relationships between the players? Our Contributions In this paper, we study a more general player-specific model of spite and altruism. Our model can be viewed as extending a given strategic game by imposing a social-network structure on top of the players, which specifies for each pair of players (i, j ) an altruism/spite level α ij signifying how much player i cares about player j ; these relations are not necessarily symmetric. This allows us to model more realistic settings in which the behavior of the players depends on a complex underlying social structure, expressing friendships and animosities among the players. Our altruistic games fall into the framework of social context games proposed by Ashlagi et al. [2] .
For this general model of games with altruism and spite, we are interested in studying the price of anarchy. The smoothness framework, originally introduced by Roughgarden [33] , has become a standard method for proving upper bounds on the price of anarchy. Basically, this framework shows that such bounds can be derived by establishing a certain smoothness condition. An additional strength of this approach Generalized second price auction ≈ 2.31 [9, 11, 28, 29] 2 (n + 1)
is that the smoothness condition allows to derive upper bounds on the price of anarchy (also called robust price of anarchy in this context) for various solution concepts, ranging from pure Nash equilibria to coarse correlated equilibria; the latter being naturally related to outcomes resulting from natural learning algorithms (e.g., see [37] ). Here, we extend the smoothness framework such that it can be used conveniently to study games with social context. Using this extension, we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy for altruistic versions of three classes of well-studied games: congestion games, minsum scheduling games, and generalized second price auctions. We show that for unrestricted altruism levels the price of anarchy is unbounded. In particular, this happens if there is a player i who cares more about some friend j than about himself, i.e., α ij > α ii . We, therefore, derive our upper bounds under the mild assumption that each player cares positively about himself and he cares about any other player at most as much as he cares about himself; we refer to this as restricted altruistic social context. Under this assumption, we derive the following upper bounds on the coarse correlated price of anarchy: -A bound of 7 for altruistic linear congestion games, and a bound of ϕ 3 ≈ 4. 24 for the special case of load balancing games, where ϕ = (1 + √ 5)/2 denotes the golden ratio. -A bound of 4 + 2 √ 3 ≈ 7.46 and 12 + 8 √ 2 ≈ 23.31 for altruistic minsum machine scheduling games for related and unrelated machines, respectively. -A bound of 2(n + 1) for altruistic generalized second price auctions, where n is the number of players.
Our results therefore show that for congestion games and minsum scheduling games the price of anarchy cannot increase drastically; specifically, it remains constant, independently of how complex the underlying altruistic social context is. On the other hand, for generalized second price auctions our results seem to suggest that the price of anarchy may degrade drastically: we obtain and upper bound of 2(n + 1), as opposed to a small constant in the purely selfish setting [9] . We also prove that this bound is asymptotically tight if one resorts to the smoothness approach; i.e., in order to improve on our bound one needs to come up with more sophisticated techniques that go beyond the standard smoothness notion. A summary of the bounds derived in this paper is given in Table 1 .
Related Work There are several papers that propose models of altruism and spite [6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 20, [23] [24] [25] . All these models are special cases of the one studied here. Among these articles, the inefficiency of equilibria in the presence of altruistic/spiteful behavior was studied for various games in [7, 10, 12, 14, 20] . After its introduction by Roughgarden [33] , the smoothness framework has been adapted in various directions [31, 35, 36] , including an extension to a particular model of altruism by Chen et al. [12] , which constitutes a special case of the altruistic games considered here.
Biló et al. [4] also studied social context congestion games, in the case where the perceived cost of a player is the minimum, maximum, or sum of the immediate cost of his neighbors. They establish, among other results, an upper bound of 17/3 on the pure price of anarchy of linear congestion games for a special case of the setting we study here.
Related but different from our setting, is the concept of graphical congestion games [5, 22] . Here the cost and the strategy set of a player depends only on a subset of the players.
After publication of a preliminary conference version of the present paper [1] , follow-up work by Rahn and Schäfer appeared as [30] . In their paper, the authors relate the study of altruistic extensions of games to a class of games, named social contribution games, and improve some of the upper bounds we give here. In particular, they show that the coarse correlated price of anarchy is 17/3 for linear congestion games and 4 for unrelated machine scheduling games; both bounds are tight.
Preliminaries
Altruistic Extensions of Games We study the effect of altruistic behavior in strategic games. To model the complex relationships between the players, we equip the underlying game with a social context. More precisely, let = (N, { i } i∈N , {c i } i∈N ) be a strategic game (termed base game), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, i is the strategy set of player i, and c i : → R is the direct cost function of player i that maps every strategy profile s ∈ = 1 × · · · × n to a real value. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that is a cost minimization game, i.e., every player i wants to minimize his individual cost function c i . Further, we assume that a social context is given by an n × n matrix α ∈ R n×n .
Given a base game and a social context α, the α-extension of is defined as the strategic game α = (N,
, where for all i ∈ N and s ∈ , the perceived cost c α i (s) of player i is given by
Thus, the perceived cost of player i in the α-extension is the α ij -weighted sum of the individual direct costs of all players in the base game. A positive (negative) α ij value signifies that player i cares positively (negatively) about the direct cost of player j , which can be interpreted as an altruistic (spiteful) attitude of i towards j . Note that α ii specifies how player i cares about himself; we also call α ii the self-perception level. For simplicity, we will often refer to the resulting game α as the α-extension, without explicitly mentioning the base game and the social context α.
The above viewpoint has a natural interpretation in terms of social networks: Suppose the players in N are identified with the nodes of a complete directed graph G = (N, A) . The weight of an edge (i, j ) ∈ A is equal to α ij , specifying the extent to which player i cares about the cost of player j .
Even though the smoothness notion that we introduce below applies to arbitrary α-extensions of games, the main focus of this paper is on altruistic behavior. We distinguish between unrestricted and restricted altruistic social contexts α. In the unrestricted case we assume that α ij ≥ 0 for every i, j ∈ N; in particular, the selfperception level of a player can be zero. In this case, one can prove trivial lower bounds for the price of anarchy, just by setting α ij = 0, for all i, j . For this reason we consider also the more interesting restricted case. In the restricted case, every player has a positive self-perception level and cares about himself at least as much as about any other player, namely, α ii > 0 and α ii ≥ α ij ≥ 0 for every i, j ∈ N, i = j . In the latter case, we can normalize α without loss of generality such that α ii = 1 for every player i. 1 Given an altruistic social context α, we refer to the resulting α-extension also as α-altruistic game.
Coarse Correlated Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy
We are interested in the efficiency loss caused by altruistic behavior. Let C :
→ R be a social cost function that maps strategy profiles to real numbers. Most of the time in this paper, the social cost will refer to the sum of the direct costs of all players, namely,
The motivation is that we are interested in the efficiency of the outcome resulting from altruistic behavior, which is modeled through the altered perceived cost functions. We use s * to refer to an optimal strategy profile that minimizes C, i.e., C(s * ) ≤ C(s) for every s ∈ .
We focus on the inefficiency of coarse correlated equilibria, which are defined as follows (e.g., see [37] ): Let σ be a probability distribution over and let σ −i denote the projection of σ onto
Then σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium of the α-extension α if, for every player i and every strategy s * i ∈ i , it holds that
We use CCE( α ) to denote the set of coarse correlated equilibria of α . Coarse correlated equilibria include several other solution concepts, such as correlated equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria, and pure Nash equilibria (e.g., see [33] ), and are thus guaranteed to exist for finite games.
We study the price of anarchy [27] of coarse correlated equilibria. For an α-extension α , define
where s * is a strategy profile that minimizes C. The coarse correlated price of anarchy of a class of α-extensions G is defined as
Some material has been omitted from the main body of the paper and can be found in the Appendix.
Smoothness
Smoothness Roughgarden [33] introduced a general smoothness framework to derive bounds on the coarse correlated price of anarchy. This framework applies to strategic games with sum-bounded social cost functions. In the context of α-extensions of games this requirement is equivalent to C(s) ≤ n i=1 c α i (s) for every s ∈ . Note that this condition is not necessarily satisfied if we allow arbitrary social contexts α ∈ R n×n . Next we extend this framework to α-extensions with arbitrary social contexts and social cost functions.
Definition 1
Let α be an α-extension of a cost minimization game with α ∈ R n×n and social cost function C. Further, let s * be an optimal strategy profile with respect to C. α is (λ, μ)-smooth if for every strategy profile s ∈ it holds that
The following theorem shows that (λ, μ)-smoothness implies a bound on the coarse correlated price of anarchy of α-extensions. In the purely selfish setting (i.e., when α ii = 1 and α ij = 0 for every i, j ∈ N, i = j ) our smoothness definition is slightly more general than the one in [33] where (2) k is required to hold for any arbitrary strategy profile s * . Also, in [33] the analogue of Theorem 1 is shown under the additional assumption that C is sum-bounded. Here, we get rid of this assumption. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.
Efficiency of No-Regret Algorithms
The above smoothness definition allows us to import some additional results from [33] . In particular, it proves useful in the context of learning algorithms generating no-regret sequences. 
If α is (λ, μ)-smooth with μ < 1, then the average cost of the sequence is
The proof is similar to the one in [33] and can be found in Appendix A.
Congestion Games
In a congestion game = (N, E, {d e } e∈E , { i } i∈N ) we are given a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of facilities E with a delay function d e : N → R for every facility e ∈ E, and a strategy set i ⊆ 2 E for every player i ∈ N. For a strategy profile s ∈ = 1 × · · · × n , define x e (s) as the number of players using facility e ∈ E, i.e., x e (s) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ s i }|. The direct cost of player i is defined as c i (s) = e∈s i d e (x e (s)) and the social cost function is given by C(s) = n i=1 c i (s). In a linear congestion game, the delay function of every facility e ∈ E is of the form d e (x) = a e x + b e , where a e , b e ∈ Q ≥0 are nonnegative rational numbers.
We note that [23] studies conditions and algorithms for the existence of Nash equilibria in linear congestion games, for a special case of our model. We need the following technical lemma for the proof of Theorem 3.
General Linear Congestion Games

Theorem 3 Every α-altruistic extension of a linear congestion game with restricted altruistic social context α is
Lemma 1 ([13]) For every two integers
The proof follows from Lemma 4.5 in [13] (with η = 1, β = 0 and γ = 2 3 ).
Proof (Theorem 3)
Let s be an arbitrary strategy profile and let s * be a strategy profile that minimizes C. We can assume without loss of generality that d e (x) = x for all e ∈ E (see, e.g., [19] ).
Recall that the social cost is defined as
Let x e and x * e refer to x e (s) and x e (s * ), respectively. Fix some player i ∈ N and let x e = x e (s * i , s −i ). Note that
otherwise.
Using these relations, we obtain
Summing over all players i, we obtain
where the inequality holds because the altruistic social context is restricted, i.e., 0 ≤ α ij ≤ 1 for every i, j ∈ N, i = j . Applying Lemma 1 (with x = x e and y = x * e ), we bound
which concludes the proof. 
Unrestricted Altruistic Social Context
where K is a large constant. The strategy sets are 1 = {{1, 2}, {3}}, 2 = {{3, 4}, {1}}. Suppose furthermore that α is given by α 11 = α 22 = 0 and α 12 = α 21 = 1. Then observe that in the α-altruistic extension of this game, the strategy profile ({1, 2}, {3, 4}) is a pure Nash equilibrium with social cost 2K + 2. The optimal social cost is 2, and is attained by the strategy profile ({3}, {1}). The price of anarchy in this game is therefore K + 1, and K can be taken arbitrarily large, so the price of anarchy is unbounded.
Load Balancing Games
We derive a better smoothness result for singleton congestion games with identical delay functions, i.e., when i ⊆ E for every i ∈ N so that for each strategy s ∈ i we have that |s| = 1 and d e (x) = x for every facility e ∈ E. We also refer to these games as load balancing games below. To proof Theorem 4 we need the following lemma, which is a variation of Lemma 1 in [16] . Its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 2 Let
be the golden ratio. For every two integers x, y ∈ N
Proof (Theorem 4) As in the proof of Theorem 3, it is sufficient to show that (3) holds with (λ, μ) = (1 + ϕ, 1/ϕ 2 ). Recall that ϕ is the golden ratio and thus λ = 1 + ϕ = ϕ 2 .
Following the same line of arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3, we obtain from (4) that we need to show that
The crucial insight here is that for load balancing games we have e∈E x * e = e∈E x e = n. We can thus rewrite the summation on the lefthand side above as by the definition of λ. Applying Lemma 2 (with x = x e and y = x * e for each e) shows (5).
Minsum Machine Scheduling
In a scheduling game, we deal with a set of machines [m], and a set of jobs [n] that are to be scheduled on the machines. For each job i ∈ [n] and machine k ∈ [m], we are given a processing time p i,k ∈ R ≥0 , which is the time it takes to run job i on machine k.
There are many ways in which a machine may execute the set of jobs it gets assigned. We restrict ourselves here to a popular policy where the jobs on a machine are executed one-by-one, in order of increasing processing time (i.e., the longer jobs are executed later). Ties are broken in a deterministic way, and we write i ≺ k j if p i,k < p j,k or p i,k = p j,k and the tie breaking rule schedules job i before job j on machine k. A schedule is a vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) , where for i ∈ [n], s i is the machine on which job i is to be run. We define the value N(i, k, s) to be the number of jobs j on machine k under strategy profile s for which it holds that i ≺ k j . Given s, the completion time of a job i under s is
The jobs take the role of the players: the strategy set of a player is [m], so the strategy profiles that arise are schedules. The cost c j (s) of a job j ∈ [n] under strategy profile s is the completion time of j under s.
We define the social cost function for this game to be the sum of the completion times of the jobs. Note that the social cost can be written as
If the processing times are not restricted in any way, we speak of unrelated machine scheduling games. We speak of related machine scheduling games if the processing times are defined as follows: For each machine k ∈ [m], there is a speed t k ∈ R >0 and for each job j ∈ [n] there is a length p j ∈ R ≥0 such that
Cole et al. [17] show that unrelated machine scheduling games (without altruism) are (2, 1/2)-smooth, resulting in a coarse correlated price of anarchy of at most 4. 2 Hoeksma and Uetz [26] prove that related machine scheduling games (without altruism) are (2, 0)-smooth, leading to the conclusion that the coarse correlated price of anarchy is at most 2.
Next, we prove constant upper bounds on the price of anarchy for restricted altruistic social contexts. (2 + x, 1/x) In [26] it is proven that the base game for the case of related machines is (2, 0)-smooth, and from the proof of Theorem 3.2 in [17] , it follows that the base game for the case of unrelated machines is (2, 1/2)-smooth. Thus, let s * be an arbitrary optimal schedule and let s be an arbitrary schedule. It suffices to show that
Theorem 5 Every α-altruistic extension of a machine scheduling game with restricted altruistic social context α is
for all x > 0. Let
Informally, P 1 (P 2 ) is the set of pairs of jobs (i, j ) such that i's strategy change from s i to s * i makes j become scheduled later (earlier), for jobs j that are scheduled on machine s * i under s (on machine s i under s). Note that for a pair of players (i, j ) that is not in P 1 ∪ P 2 , we have c j (s * i , s −i ) − c j (s) = 0, and for (i, j ) ∈ P 2 it holds that
We now rewrite this last expression into a summation over the machines. We obtain:
Consider a job i and machine k such that it holds that s * i = k, s i = k, and 
which is less than or equal to
Note that for every job
Therefore, the expression on the right-hand side of (6) is equivalent to
Note that j ∈ S(i, k) implies that s j = k and that i ≺ k j . We relax some of the constraints in the summations and so we upper bound the expression in (7) by
The next step in the derivation is made by observing that for each job j and each machine k such that s j = k, there are at most (N(j, k, s 
To see this, assume for contradiction that there are more than (N(j, k, s N(j, k, s )− x + 1)/x + 1)-th largest job for which these three properties hold. Then, there are at least (N(j, k, s ) − x + 1)/x jobs scheduled on machine k that have these properties and that are scheduled after i on machine k under strategy s * . Therefore, we have that N(j, k, s) , which is a contradiction.
Using this observation together with (6), (7) and (8), we obtain
where for the second inequality we use the basic fact that a ≤ a + 1 for all a ∈ R.
Similarly to congestion games, the assumption of the altruistic social context being restricted is necessary. Next we provide an example showing that the price of anarchy is unbounded if the altruistic social context is unrestricted.
Example 2 Fix a number M ∈ R >0 arbitrarily, and consider the scheduling game with two machines and two jobs. The speeds are given by t 1 = 1/M, t 2 = 1. The job lengths are given by p 1 = p 2 = 1. Suppose that the altruism levels are as follows:
Then the schedule where job 1 is on machine 1 and job 2 is on machine 2 is a pure Nash equilibrium. The social cost of this equilibrium is M + 1. When M ≥ 2, it is a social optimum to schedule both jobs on machine 2, and this schedule achieves a social cost of 3. Therefore, for M ≥ 2, the price of anarchy of this altruistic scheduling game is (M + 1)/3. Because M can be picked arbitrarily large, this shows that the price of anarchy is arbitrarily bad for altruistic extensions of scheduling games, when we allow arbitrary altruism levels.
Profit Maximization Games and Generalized Second-Price Auctions
In this section we study generalized second-price auctions, which are profit maximization games. We will, therefore, first extend our notions to profit maximization games. Then we will apply the extended framework to second-price auctions.
Profit Maximization Games
The smoothness definition introduced in Section 2 can naturally be adapted to profit maximization games. Let = (N, { i } i∈N , {p i } i∈N ) be a strategic game, where each player i seeks to maximize his direct profit function p i : → R. The α-altruistic extension α of is defined similarly as for cost minimization games.
Definition 2
Let α be an α-extension of a profit maximization game with α ∈ R n×n and social welfare function . Further, let s * be a strategy profile that maximizes . α is (λ, μ)-smooth if for every strategy profile s ∈ it holds that
The proof of the following theorem proceeds along the same lines as the one of Theorem 1 and is omitted. We are now ready to study generalized second-price auctions.
Generalized Second-Price Auctions
We study auctions where a set N = [n] of n bidders compete for k slots. Each bidder i ∈ N has a valuation v i ∈ R ≥0 and specifies a bid b i ∈ R ≥0 . Each slot j ∈ [k] has a click-through rate γ j ∈ R ≥0 . Without loss of generality, we assume that the slots are sorted according to their click-through rates such that γ 1 ≥ · · · ≥ γ k and that k = n. 3 We consider the generalized second price auction (GSP) as the underlying mechanism. . This assumption is made for reasons related to individual rationality: overbidding is a dominated strategy. The same reasoning still applies if players are altruistic. Therefore, we will assume that bidders do not overbid.
We now prove an upper bound of O(n) on the coarse correlated price of anarchy of α-altruistic extensions of generalized second price auctions if the altruistic social context is restricted. Proof Let b * and b be two bidding profiles. By renaming, we assume that for all j , bidder j gets assigned to slot j under bidding profile b.
The base game is known to be (λ 1 , μ 1 ) = ( 1 2 , 1)-smooth [31] . That is, for every two bidding profiles b, b * , it holds that i∈N u i (b
Combining these inequalities proves (λ, μ) = ( The following example shows that the O(n) upper bound derived in Theorem 7 is asymptotically best possible if one sticks to the smoothness framework introduced above. As a consequence, in order to improve on our O(n) bound one has to resort to more refined techniques.
Example 3 Let n be even and define k = n/2. We define an instance of n + 1 bidders as follows. Let
Subsequently, we will make sure that ε, 0 < ε < 1, is chosen sufficiently small. Further, define the bidder valuations as
We assume that no bidder overbids his valuation. In particular, this implies that bidder n + 1 bids zero always.
Let
be an optimal bidding profile maximizing social welfare. Note that b * i > b * n+1 = 0 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} because otherwise bidder n + 1 would be assigned to a slot with click-through rate at least ε, which is a contradiction to the optimality of b * . The total social welfare of b * is (b
. . , n}. Note that this is always possible because b * i > 0 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Also note that this implies that b i < ε for all i because we assume that bidders do not overbid. Thus, by choosing ε sufficiently small, we ensure that the bids in b become arbitrarily small but induce the order as indicated above. We have
If bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} changes his bid from b i to b * i , then he is assigned to slot 1 in (b * i , b −i ), thereby shifting the players 1, . . . , i − 1 one slot down (relative to the slots they are assigned to under b). Observe that bidder k is assigned to the last slot with click-through rate 1. As a consequence, whenever one of the bidders i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} deviates to (b * i , b −i ), bidder k is shifted from his slot k with click-through rate 1 down to slot k + 1 with click-through rate ε. We will exploit this below.
Consider the left-hand side of the smoothness definition
Fix player i and consider the contribution
) of player j to the sum. Clearly, j (n + 1) = 0 for every j because bidder n + 1 is assigned to slot n + 1 under both profiles. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We distinguish four cases depending on the position of j with respect to i:
The deviation of i does not affect player j and thus j (i) = 0. Case j = i: Player i moves up to the first slot for which he pays b 1 . Thus
Case j = i − 1: Player j moves down one slot for which he pays b j +2 (instead of b j +1 under b). Thus
Case j < i − 1: Player j moves down one slot for which he pays b j +1 (as under b). Thus
Choosing ε sufficiently small we can make sure that the total contribution of the payments b in each j (i) in each of the above four cases is negligible.
We consider the restricted social context, so without loss of generality we assume that all α ii are normalized to 1. Recall that γ 1 = 1. Ignoring the effect of the payments (which we just argued is negligible if we make ε small enough), the total contribution to the left-hand side of the smoothness definition is thus which implies (letting ε → 0) that μ + 1 ≥ λk. This provides an asymptotic lower bound of 1 + μ λ ≥ k 1 = n 2 on the possible price of anarchy achievable by our smoothness framework.
Conclusions
We studied the coarse correlated price of anarchy of altruistic extensions of three fundamental classes of games. The main focus of this paper was put on deriving upper bounds that are independent of the underlying social network structure. An interesting open question is whether one can derive refined bounds by exploiting structural properties of the underlying social network.
In the present studies, we concentrated on altruistic games with nonnegative altruistic social contexts α, even though our model of altruistic games and the smoothness definition introduced in Sections 2 and 3 allow us to incorporate spiteful behavior as well. We leave it as an interesting open direction for future research to pursue such analyses for spiteful behavior. Another open question to investigate is whether local smoothness conditions can be formulated such that they can be used for analysis of various altruistic games, in the spirit of [32] . Since μ < 1, this implies that the coarse correlated price of anarchy is at most λ/(1 − μ).
By summing (12) over all t and using (11), we obtain that the average cost of the sequence of T outcomes is
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof (Lemma 2) It is easy to check that the claim holds if x = 0 or y = 0. Let x ≥ 1 and y ≥ 1. Recall that 1 + ϕ = ϕ 2 . We have
where the first inequality follows because z 2 ≥ 2z − 1 for every z ∈ R and the last one holds because x ≥ 1 and y ≥ 1.
